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This paper is about the semantics of production rule sets, a language used tomodel asyn-
chronous digital circuits. Two formal semantics are developed and proved equivalent: a set-
theoretic semantics that improvesuponanearlier effort of ours, andanexecutable semantics
in rewriting logic. The set-theoretic semantics is especially suited tometa-level proofs about
production rule sets, whereas the executable semantics can be used with existing tools to
establish, automatically, desirable properties of individual circuits. Experiments involving
several small circuits are detailed wherein the executable semantics and the rewriting logic
tool Maude are used to automatically check two important properties: hazard and deadlock
freedom. In doing so, we derive several useful optimizations that make automatic checking
of these properties more tractable.
© 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Asynchronous digital circuits have been employed to design low-power, high-performancemicroprocessors, e.g., [20], as
well as in emerging applications such as systems-on-chip (SOCs), e.g., [18], soft-error-tolerant systems, e.g., [9], and nano-
electronics, e.g., [19]. The critical property that makes asynchronous circuits advantageous in these applications is their
enormous immunity to both intrinsic and extrinsic timing variation. The most common failure mechanism in synchronous
circuits, set-up and hold time variation of latches, is simply not present in many asynchronous circuit families. At present,
the major difficulty in designing asynchronous circuits is that very few commercially supported asynchronous electronic
design automation (EDA) tools or standard cell libraries exist, making design and implementation of asynchronous circuits
more challenging than for synchronous ones.
The presentwork concerns the language of production rule sets, whichwas introduced as part of a correct-by-construction
synthesis method for asynchronous digital circuits [15]. According to this methodology, designs are first given in a high-
level hardware description language called Communicating Hardware Processes (CHP). The CHP description is synthesized
into a semantically equivalent hierarchical network of gates and digital switches called a production rule set. From a given
production rule set, one can then straightforwardly generate an equivalent representation in a variety of circuit technologies,
including CMOS (complementary metal–oxide–semiconductor).
This paper addresses two issues concerning production rule sets. The first is the fundamental question of what does a
production rule set mean? To that end, we treat production rule sets as a formal language and assign to that language a
semantics. 1 One of themost important aspects addressed by our semantics, and one that will consume a substantial portion
of the development, are notions of circuit failure called hazards.
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1 It should be noted for readers familiar with asynchronous circuit design that the semantics developed captures a particular timing assumption, specifically
delay-insensitivity. Section 7 briefly addresses two more sophisticated timing assumptions, namely speed-independence and quasi-delay-insensitivity.
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In addition to the theoretical importance of providing a solidmathematical foundation to understand production rule sets
and the circuits derived from them, there are numerous practical benefits to having defined a precise formal semantics. In
particular, a formal semantics helps facilitate a common understanding of what circuits designed using production rule sets
are, and it affordsnewcomers to thefieldof asynchronousdesignanunambiguous framework inwhich tounderstandexisting
work. Additionally, a formal semantics provides a set of mathematical tools for proving properties about asynchronous
circuits, and lays the foundation for the development of automated tools to reason about those circuits.
The second issue that this paper addresses is just this problem: that of automatically proving properties about production
rule sets, much like one might prove properties about a software program. Specifically, we consider a notion of deadlock
freedom that is appropriate for production rule sets, as well as a property called hazard freedom. Both of these properties
are necessary conditions for a circuit to be considered correct. As we will demonstrate, another benefit of having a precise
formal semantics is that, when that semantics is given in an executable way, some analyses, including deadlock and hazard
freedom, can be made completely automatic. Executability is obtained in this paper through a semantic formalization in
rewriting logic [21,22] which, through the rewriting logic engine Maude [5], offers various automated and semi-automated
analysis possibilities.
Contributions. This paper, which primarily extends [10] but also builds on our earlier work from [12], makes several new
contributions:
• A new set-theoretic semantics for production rule sets is developed, relative to a timing assumption called delay-
insensitivity [16]. The semantics is an improvement on our earlier work from [12], providing a more familiar operational
style and, we feel, improved clarity. This semantics is referred to here as SPRS.• A new rewriting logic semantics is developed that improves on our earlier workshop paper [10], fromwhich this current
paper is derived. It has the desirable property that it matches almost exactly the set-theoretic semantics, and is referred
to here asRPRS.• The close relationship between SPRS and RPRS is proved formally through the development of a strong bisimulation
between their induced transition systems. This establishes their correctness relative to each other, a common technique
from programming language theory.
• The automated analysis results from [10], which demonstrated the feasibility of proving hazard freedom and deadlock
freedom of asynchronous circuits described as production rule sets, are extended to apply to the new rewriting logic
semantics.
• Ourpreviousworkon involving themorecomplex timingassumptionsof speed-independenceandquasi-delay-insensitivity
is put into context with the newwork presented here, so as to provide a complete picture of the current state of our work
on the semantics of production rule sets and suggest where to proceed going forward in future work.
Organization. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 present some preliminaries on rewriting logic
and Maude. Section 3 defines SPRS, a formal set-theoretic semantics of production rule sets for the delay-insensitive case.
Section 4 definesRPRS, a formal executable semantics of production rule sets in rewriting logic. Section 5 defines and proves a
strong bisimulation relation between transition systems induced by SPRS andRPRS, thus establishing the relative correctness
of SPRS andRPRS. Section 6 concerns the use of theMaude tool to check deadlock and hazard freedomautomatically. Section 7
briefly reviews our previouswork on two additional timing assumptions, speed-independence andquasi-delay-insensitivity,
rounding out the current state of our work on the semantics of production rule sets. Section 8 considers some related work,
and Section 9 finishes with concluding remarks.
2. Preliminaries on rewriting logic and Maude
Rewriting logic [21] is a semantic framework for concurrency that has been shown to express in a simple and very natural
way a wide range of concurrent systems. In particular, this applies not only to models of concurrent computation and to
distributed algorithms, but also to programming languages, where it has stimulated the so-called rewriting logic semantics
project [22], where semantic definitions of concurrent programming languages and hardware description languages (HDLs)
are given bymeans of rewrite theories. As emphasized in [22] and exploited in detail in the current work, the rewriting logic
semantics of a language is both mathematical and operational. That is, the mathematical semantics is given by the initial
model of the rewrite theory; and the operational semantics is given by rewriting logic deduction and makes the language
definitions executable and analyzable by model checking in a language like Maude [5]. This paper applies this framework
to the case of the highly concurrent HDL of production rule sets, which specify asynchronous circuits. The mathematical
semantics of the rewrite theory characterizing the behavior of production rule sets is used to prove the semantic equivalence
between the rewriting logic semantics and a set-theoretic semantics; and the operational semantics is systematically used
to show how asynchronous circuits specified this way can be formally analyzed by model checking.
A rewrite theory is a triple (, E, R), where (, E) is an equational theory (in this paper we will assume that (, E) is an
order-sorted equational theory, with types, subtypes, and overloading of function symbols); and where R is a collection of
possibly conditional rewrite rules of the form t → t′ if cond. What (, E) specifies are the states of the concurrent system
being modeled, so that a state is an element of the initial algebra T/E specified by (, E). The operations in  should be
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understood as distributed state constructors, so that a state, say, f (t1, . . . , tn) is the parallel composition with f of the smaller
states t1, . . . , tn. The equations E characterize the structural properties of such states (and also define any auxiliary function
on states). For example, f may be associative and commutative, so that a distributed state built with f can be thought of as a
“soup” of local states. What the rules in R specify are the local concurrent transitions possible in the given distributed system;
that is, a rule t → t′ if cond specifies that whenever a fragment of the distributed state is an instance of the pattern t and
satisfies the condition cond, then that fragment can make an atomic local transition to the corresponding instance of the
pattern t′. Rewriting logic is intrinsically concurrent because it allows many such local concurrent transitions to take place
simultaneously. In fact, what the deduction rules of rewriting logic [21] do is to specify and characterize all the possible
concurrent transitions of the system so specified, so that concurrent computation and rewriting logic deduction become
identical.
Maude [5] is an executable formal specification language and system directly based on rewriting logic. In Maude there
are two main types of modules: (i) functional modules, which are equational specifications of the form fmod (, E) endfm
with an initial algebra semantics; and (ii) system modules, which are rewriting logic specifications of the form mod (, E, R)
endfm with an initial model semantics. Both functional and system modules are required to satisfy natural executability
conditions such as confluence and termination of the equations E, and coherence of the rules Rwith respect to the equations
(see [5]), making them suitable for execution byMaude. Maude has user-definable syntax, plus keywords for specifying types
(called sorts), subtypes, equations, and rewrite rules. This makes Maude specifications essentially self-explanatory: anybody
familiar with the formalism of equations and rewrite rules can easily read the corresponding Maude versions as essentially
typewriter versions of themathematical textbook-like descriptions. Besides supporting simulation of specifications with its
reduce command for functional modules and its rewrite command for systemmodules, Maude also has good support for
model checking analysis. Specifically, failure of invariants can be uncovered with its breadth first search command; and LTL
model checking of properties is provided by its MODEL-CHECKERmodule [5].
3. Set-theoretic semantics: SPRS
This section revisits our work in [12], providing a revised set-theoretic semantics for production rule sets for the delay-
insensitive case. We refer generally to the formalization given in this section as SPRS. Compared to [12], SPRS applies only to
the delay-insensitive case, but gains a more familiar operational formalization and, as a result of the more limited scope,
a treatment which is substantially clearer and more concise. The term “set-theoretic” is used to distinguish the semantics
presented in this section, which uses just standard notions from mathematics, such as sets, functions, and relations, from
the executable rewriting logic semantics which follows in Section 4.
The set-theoretic semantics is useful in various ways. It is suitable as a basis for formal proofs about production rule sets,
an extensive example of which is developed in [12]. A clear formal semantics is also crucial to facilitating communication
between, and a common understanding among, practitioners, as well as for helping newcomers to the field understand
essential concepts.
Section 3.1 deals with the syntax of production rule sets. Section 3.2 introduces the semantics informally through a small
example. For simplicity, hazards are omitted from the discussion in that section. Section 3.3 formalizes the semantics in
detail, including hazards, and Section 3.4 returns to the example circuit and works through an execution that generates a
hazard. Section 3.5 contains a discussion about production rule sets in the context of two somewhat similar formalisms for
concurrency, guarded commands and communicating sequential processes.
3.1. Syntax
The “syntax” of production rule sets consists of a mathematical construct defining a single production rule, and then a
mechanism for gathering together finite sets of these constructions; hence the name production rule sets. There is also a
stylized way of writing production rule sets that we review below. The choice of which notation to use is just a matter of
convenience.
Definition 1 (Syntax of Production Rule Sets). Let Y denote a denumerable set of variables used to specify node names. A
production rule is a triple (g, x, d), with g, the guard, being a boolean expression involving variables from Y , x ∈ Y is the
transition variable, and d ∈ {↑,↓} is the transition direction. A production rule set is a finite set of production rules.
A production rule (g, x, d) is often written in the following, stylized manner
g → x d
and a set of production rules {(g1, x1, d1), . . . , (gm, xm, dm)} is often written as a newline-separated list of the individual
rules
g1 → x1d1
...
gm → xmdm
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Fig. 1. Gate-level and CMOS-level specification of a 3-inverter ring oscillator.
3.2. Example
The purpose of this section is to give, by way of example, an informal introduction to the dynamic behavior of production
rule sets; that is, their semantics. The example circuit we consider is shown in Fig. 1. It is known as a 3-inverter ring oscillator.
Digital ring oscillators are typically among the first circuits designed and tested in new process technologies, and they
can be used as timing elements and clock generators. The simplest ring-oscillator consists of an odd number of inverters
connected sequentially to form a loop. Since the number of inverters is odd, the output of each inverter will change value in
sequence perpetually; as such, the ring of inverters is said to oscillate. For electrical reasons, a single inverter ring does not
oscillate, so the simplest ring oscillator contains three inverters.
Fig. 1 depicts a 3-inverter ring oscillator consisting of two simple inverters and onemodified inverter. In order to simplify
the presentation of certain undesired circuit behaviors, we have made it so that the transistors governing the inverter with
output x2 may switch independently.
2 The production rule set corresponding to the 3-inverter ring oscillator depicted in
Fig. 1 is
¬x3 → x1 ↑ x1 → x1,1 ↑ x1 → x1,2 ↑ ¬x1,1 → x2 ↑ ¬x2 → x3 ↑
x3 → x1 ↓ ¬x1 → x1,1 ↓ ¬x1 → x1,2 ↓ x1,2 → x2 ↓ x2 → x3 ↓
Let us assume that the oscillator begins in a state where the nodes take values according to a function σ : {x1, x1,1,
x1,2, x2, x3} −→ {0, 1} defined by
x1, x1,1, x1,2, x3 → 0
x2 → 1
For the moment we will think of the semantics of production rule sets as essentially specifying all possible σ ′s reachable
from σ in a single computation step.
Informally, the σ ′s reachable from σ are obtained by considering all rules with a true guard, choosing any subset of them,
and then executing the right-hand sides of the rules in this set. In our example, all of the following rules have guards that are
true
¬x3 → x1 ↑ ¬x1,1 → x2 ↑
¬x1 → x1,1 ↓ ¬x1 → x1,2 ↓ x2 → x3 ↓
However, note that while all of these production rules have guards that evaluate to true in the current state, only the rule
¬x3 → x1 ↑ can effect an observable change in the state of the circuit nodes (x1 rises from 0 to 1); this is a notion we call
enablement; the rule ¬x3 → x1 ↑ is said to be enabled, whereas, for example, the rule x2 → x3 ↓ is not enabled.
As there is only a single enabled rule, and because the semantics allows for selecting no rules during a step, there are
only two possible σ ′s reachable from σ ; namely σ ′ = σ and the σ ′ defined by
x1, x2 → 1
x1,1, x1,2, x3 → 0
From the above σ ′, where x1 has switched, there are four σ ′′s subsequently reachable, one for each subset of {x1,1, x1,2}.
Both of these nodes are enabled to switch to 1, and in a single step either node may, independently, “choose” to switch or
not switch.
2 In modern CMOS technologies (65 nm and smaller), transistor parameters vary significantly from their nominal values due to process-induced variation and
randomdopant fluctuation. Considering a large circuit with say billions of transistors, therewill exist a few gates, e.g., inverters, with extreme parameter variation
where, for example, the PFET is several orders ofmagnitude slower than theNFET. It then becomes reasonable tomodel such a gatewith independently-controlled
transistors.
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The semantics as just described omits onemajor issue that will be handled in the formal semantics: hazards. The concept
of a hazard corresponds to a circuit failure and will manifest itself by a node in the circuit taking a value Xwhich is distinct
from the usual 0 or 1. We will return to the 3-inverter ring oscillator in Section 3.4 to expand the example execution steps
so that hazards and their semantics are accounted for.
3.3. Set-theoretic semantics
At a high level, our goal is to define a binary relation between program states, denoted −→P , that corresponds to one
step of concurrent execution, relative to a production rule set P. s −→P s′ means that it is possible to reach state s′ from
state s in one computation step. The space of executions is then given by the infinite −→P-chains
s1 −→P s2 −→P s3 −→P · · ·
subject to a form of fairness described later.
Fix a production rule set P. VariableP ⊆ Y denotes the set of all variables occurring in P. A state (with respect to P) is a
pair
(σ : VariableP −→ Level,H ⊆ VariableP)
where Level
def= {0, X, 1}. The set of all states (with respect to P) is denoted StateP .
The σ component of a state (σ,H) serves the familiar purpose of specifying values for all nodes in the circuit, with the
X value meaning that a hazard has been expressed at that node. As indicated in the introduction, the treatment of certain
kinds of circuit failures called hazards is a central feature of our semantics, and a substantial portion of the development
will be dedicated to defining the semantics of hazards. The second component of a state, set H above, also pertains hazards.
Hazards come in two varieties, interference and instability hazards. An interference hazard occurs when a node is simulta-
neously being pulled both up and down in the current state, roughly corresponding to a short circuit. For a given valuation
σ : VariableP −→ Level, and we define a set
InterferenceP,σ ⊆ VariableP
such that y ∈ InterferenceP,σ iff there exists g1 → y ↑, g2 → y ↓∈ P such that σ(g1) = σ(g2) = 1. Note that the notation
just used assumes a natural extension, used throughout this paper, of the domain ofσ from variables to boolean expressions,
such as g1 and g2. The one complication of this is that we are operating within a three-valued universe, instead of the usual
two-valued one of booleans. Therefore, we will assume that the meaning of the usual boolean operators (¬,∧,∨) on {0, 1}
are extended to {0, X, 1} according to the following equivalences.
¬X = X X ∧ 0 = 0 X ∧ 1 = X X ∨ 1 = 1 X ∨ 0 = X X ∧ X = X X ∨ X = X.
Instability hazards occur when a gate starts pulling toward a new output level, but before reaching a stable voltage level,
the gate stops pulling. This is a property of a computation step, (σ,H) −→P (σ ′,H′), and is captured by a set
InstabilityP,σ,σ ′ ⊆ VariableP .
To define this set, we first need an auxiliary notion, introduced informally in the example given in the previous section,
called enablement. Given a valuation σ , EnabledP,σ ⊆ VariableP is defined so that y ∈ EnabledP,σ if and only if
• σ(y) = 0 and there exists a g → y ↓ ∈ P such that σ(g) = 1, or
• σ(y) = 1 and there exists a g → y ↑ ∈ P such that σ(g) = 1.
Given enablement, y ∈ InstabilityP,σ,σ ′ iff y ∈ EnabledP,σ , y /∈ EnabledP,σ ′ , and σ(y) = σ ′(y).
For convenience, we define a third predicate which captures both of the above hazards, as well as the propagation of
hazards that have been expressed previously.
HazardP,σ,σ ′ ⊆ VariableP
is defined such that y ∈ HazardP,σ,σ ′ iff any of the following conditions are met:
• y ∈ InterferenceP,σ ′ ;• y ∈ InstabilityP,σ,σ ′ ;• there exists a g → yd ∈ P such that σ ′(g) = X.
A set of actions, namely variable assignments and skip (with respect to P), is defined as
ActionP
def= {skip} ∪ {x := v | x ∈ VariableP, v ∈ Level}
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Given a set of actions A ⊆ ActionP and a variable x ∈ VariableP , we denote the subset of x-actions of A as
A|x def= {y := v ∈ A | y = x}
Definition 2 (Set-theoretic Semantics of Production Rule Sets). Let
P = {r1, . . . , rm}
be a production rule set. The evaluation relation
−→⊆ (P × StateP) × ActionP
is defined inductively according to the following five inference rules, the first four governing the evaluation of the action of
individual rules:
·
σ(g) = 1〈g → x ↑, (σ,H)〉 −→ x := 1
·
σ(g) = 1〈g → x ↓, (σ,H)〉 −→ x := 0
·
x ∈ H〈g → x d, (σ,H)〉 −→ x := X
·
〈g → x d, (σ,H)〉 −→ skip
Then, the relation −→P is defined by the following fifth rule, which combines the evaluation results of all of the rules
r1, . . . , rm, and, additionally, specifies the updated H set.
〈r1, (σ,H)〉 −→ a1 . . . 〈rm, (σ,H)〉 −→ am
(σ,H) −→P (σ [a1, . . . , am],H[σ, a1, . . . , am])
where, letting A = {a1, . . . , am}, the node valuation function σ is updated to
σ [a1, . . . , am](x) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 if A|x = {x := 1}
0 if A|x = {x := 0}
X if A|x = {x := X} or |A|x| > 1
σ(x) if A|x = ∅
and the setH of possible hazards is updated to the setH[σ, a1, . . . , am] such that for all y ∈ VariableP , y ∈ H[σ, a1, . . . , am]
iff
• y ∈ HazardP,σ,σ [a1,...,am], or• y ∈ H and σ(y) = σ [a1, . . . , am](y).
Note the fact that a pair 〈g → x d, (σ,H)〉 can evaluate to skip. skip has no effect on the state, which means that
the semantics supports true concurrency, wherein a subset of the set P of production rules actually contributes to a state
transition (σ,H) −→P (σ ′,H′).
An execution is amapping ξ : N −→ StateP such that for all j ∈ N, ξ(j) −→P ξ(j+1) and such that for all y ∈ VariableP ,
it is not the case that there exists a j ∈ N where for all i > j, y ∈ EnabledP,σi or y ∈ Hi, but y never switches; that is,
σi(y) = σj(y). This condition is the aforementioned fairness constraint.
3.4. Example with hazards
Let us return to the example of Section 3.2 and work through a simple set of execution steps that result in a hazard. The
hazard that will be manifested is an interference hazard at the inverter whose output is x2. We will make crucial use of the
independent control of that gate’s component transistors.
We begin again at the same place we did in Section 3.2, with the obvious exception that we now account for hazards. So,
our initial state s0 = (σ0,H0) has σ0 defined by
x1, x1,1, x1,2, x3 → 0
x2 → 1
and H0 = ∅.
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Going to s1 = (σ1,H1), we let x1 switch. Therefore, σ1 is given by
x1, x2 → 1
x1,1, x1,2, x3 → 0
and H1 = ∅.
The inference rules governing the action of individual rules always allow for a skip action to be generated and thus
s −→P s is always a legal computation step for any production rule set P and any state s. Informally, this corresponds to
choosing the empty set of rules with true guards. Along such lines, let us say that s2 = s1.
In going from s2 = s1 to s3 = (σ3,H3), we will create the basic condition for the hazard to become expressed. Let σ3 be
such that x1,2 switches, but x1,1 does not; these are the only two currently enabled rules. That is, σ3 is
x1, x1,2, x2 → 1
x1,1, x3 → 0
The interesting aspect of this state change is that H3 becomes non-empty. It is straightforward to check that x2 ∈
HazardP,σ2,σ3 , and therefore that x2 ∈ H3. Since there are production rules ¬x1,1 → x2 ↑, x1,2 → x2 ↓ ∈ P, both
with guards that are true in σ3, then x2 is witnessing an interference hazard in s2; and one can show that H3 = {x2}.
Finally, an X can become expressed in going to s4 = (σ4,H4) with
x1, x1,2 → 1
x1,1, x3 → 0
x2 → X
and H4 = {x3}.
3.5. Concurrency in production rule sets
Although the language of production rule sets shares certain featureswith both guarded commands [7] and communicating
sequential processes (CSP) [8], it isneverthelessquitedifferent frombothof theabove formalisms. Inparticular, it is tempting to
view production rule sets via similar constructs from guarded commands or CSP, but this is incorrect. As a simple, somewhat
contrived example, consider the following production rule set, which describes how, depending on the current value of
nodes x and y in the circuit, nodes z and w could be concurrently pulled up toward logical 1 (↑) or pulled down toward
logical 0 (↓)
x → z ↓
y → w ↓
¬y → w ↑,
A reasonable candidate translation into the language of guarded commands would be the statement
do x → z := 0
[ ] y → w := 0
[ ] ¬y → w := 1,
od
Similarly, one might reasonably attempt to view the above production rule set as the following CSP parallel command
∗ [ x → z := 0 ] ||
∗ [ y → w := 0 ] ||
∗ [ ¬y → w := 1 ]
All three formalizations are, in fact, semantically different; most importantly, the production rule set exhibits both the
possibility of only some of the production rules being fired, as well as a form of “true concurrency” which is different from
the standard one-at-a-time semantics of the guarded command statement, or the interleaving semantics of CSP’s parallel
command operator.
If x = y = z = w = 1, then, for the above production rule set, the following are all possible next states of z,w according
to the production rule set semantics:
z = 1, w = 1;
z = 1, w = 0;
z = 0, w = 1;
z = 0, w = 0.
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In a single step of computation, neither the guarded command statement nor the parallel command can change both z and
w to 0 since, according to the usual operational semantics of these systems, each change in the value of a variable requires a
separate semantic step. The guarded command statement and the CSP parallel command are even different from each other,
since performing an action requires peeling off different sets of syntactic constructs by the operational rules.
4. Rewriting logic semantics:RPRS
The purpose of this section is to translate the set-theoretic semantics of Section 3 into an executable one using rewriting
logic [21], a formalism which has been shown [22] to be well suited for exactly this task. The particular notation used is
that of the rewriting logic tool Maude [5]. As we will see, the rewriting logic semantics mimics closely the set-theoretic
semantics. The rewriting logic theory described in this section will be referred to asRPRS.
Executability, in a variety of useful forms, is obtained as a direct result of employing the Maude tool, which allows us
to simulate circuits as well as exhaustively check that a circuit satisfies desirable correctness properties, such as hazard
freedom and deadlock freedom, for example. Exploiting the execution and formal analysis capabilities gained from the
Maude specification is the subject of Section 6 (the entire Maude specification is available at [11]).
The syntax of production rule sets is defined first. Recall that a production rule is a triple g → x d with g a Boolean
expression, x a variable, and d the transition direction. What is needed in rewriting logic are new sorts corresponding to
these concepts and populated with appropriate terms. Maude’s QIDmodule [5, Section 9.2] provides our variables: strings
of characters preceded by a single quote.
fmod AUX-SYNTAX is pr QID * (sort Qid to Variable) .
sorts Guard Direction ProductionRule .
subsort Variable < Guard .
op not_ : Guard -> Guard .
op _and_ : Guard Guard -> Guard .
op _or_ : Guard Guard -> Guard .
ops + - : -> Direction .
op [_->_ _] : Guard Variable Direction -> ProductionRule .
endfm
Compared to the syntax from Section 3, the corresponding terms using Maude notation are very similar. The production
rule ¬y → w ↑ becomes the term [not ’y -> ’w +] of sort ProductionRule in Maude, for example.
Obtaining an appropriate rewriting logic definition of sets of production rules ismost easily accomplished by instantiating
Maude’s parameterized SET module ([5, Section 9.12.2]) with a view expressing the fact that elements of the set will be
terms of sort ProductionRule. Themodule given next does exactly that; additionally, it renames the default sort and union
operator to a more convenient syntax. The details of parameterized programming in Maude (theories, views, etc.) can be
found in [5, Section 8.3].
view ProductionRule from TRIV to AUX-SYNTAX is
sort Elt to ProductionRule .
endv
fmod SYNTAX is pr SET{ProductionRule} *
( sort Set{ProductionRule} to ProductionRuleSet
, op _,_ to _ _
) .
endfm
Therefore, in the notation of the SYNTAXmodule, the production rule set
x → z ↓
y → w ↓
¬y → w ↑,
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becomes a term of sort ProductionRuleSet, written in Maude as
[ ’x -> ’z -]
[ ’y -> ’w -]
[not ’y -> ’w +]
Continuing from the start of Section 3.3, we define an operator which takes a production rule set P as an argument and
returns the set of Variable terms corresponding to the set VariableP defined in Section 3.3. Recall that VariableP was defined
to be the set containing all of the variables occurring in P. Variables can be embedded into the guard g of a rule g → x d,
and also include all transition variables (x in g → x d).
view Variable from TRIV to SYNTAX is
sort Elt to Variable .
endv
fmod AUX-SEMANTICS-1 is
pr SET{Variable} * (sort Set{Variable} to 2ˆVariable) .
--- meta-variable declarations omitted
op Variable-{_} : ProductionRuleSet -> 2ˆVariable .
eq Variable-{ empty} = empty .
eq Variable-{[G -> Y D] P} =
varsOf(G), Y, Variable-{P} .
op varsOf : Guard -> 2ˆVariable .
eq varsOf(Y) = Y .
eq varsOf(not G) = varsOf(G) .
eq varsOf(G1 and G2) = varsOf(G1) , varsOf(G2) .
eq varsOf(G1 or G2) = varsOf(G1) , varsOf(G2) .
endfm
Notice that we have omitted the meta-variable declarations used in the equations of the above module, something we
will continue to do in subsequent modules. Each used variable is given a sort equal to the one declared for the operator
argument in which it is positioned (see [11] for details).
Unlike the set VariableP , which was specified according an equationally defined function, the sets Level and StateP will
be given entirely new sorts. Recall that Level = {0, X, 1} and that for a production rule set P a state is a pair (σ,H) with
σ : VariableP −→ Level and H ⊆ VariableP . The σ component is defined using Maude’s MAPmodule [5, Section 9.13.1].
fmod AUX-SEMANTICS-2 is pr AUX-SEMANTICS-1 .
sorts Level .
ops 0 1 X : -> Level .
endfm
view Level from TRIV to AUX-SEMANTICS-2 is
sort Elt to Level .
endv
fmod AUX-SEMANTICS-3 is
pr MAP{Variable,Level} * (op _[_] to _(_)) .
sort State .
op (_,_) : Map{Variable,Level} 2ˆVariable -> State .
endfm
Note that the parameter P of StateP is effectively ignored in our rewriting logic specification. The implication of this is
that, in principle, one could introduce a statewhich has or lacks a valuation for any variable, regardless ofwhether or not that
variable is in a production rule set P under consideration. This could be fixed through the use of memberships [5, Section 4],
but the specification would continue to be unsatisfactory for efficiency and other reasons. Furthermore, if we begin with a
correct state, the rules in the rewriting semantics will never lead to an inconsistent state; therefore, ignoring the parameter
P in StateP is harmless.
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As an example of what AUX-SEMANTICS-3 provides, suppose that we have a state (σ,H) for the above production rule
set where
σ(x) = 0
σ(y) = 0
σ(z) = 1
σ(w) = X
and H = {y, z}; the representation of (σ,H) as a term of sort State is written in the Maude notation as
((’x |-> 0, ’y |-> 0, ’z |-> 1, ’w |-> X), (’y , ’z))
Moving on to thedefinition of the various hazard-related concepts,wewill require the ability to evaluate guards according
to a three-valued valuation.
fmod AUX-SEMANTICS-4 is pr AUX-SEMANTICS-3 .
... --- meta-variable declarations omitted
op _(_) : Map{Variable,Level} Guard -> Level .
eq Sigma(not G1) = not3 Sigma(G1) .
eq Sigma(G1 and G2) = Sigma(G1) and3 Sigma(G2) .
eq Sigma(G1 or G2) = Sigma(G1) or3 Sigma(G2) .
op not3_ : Level -> Level [prec 24] .
eq not3 0 = 1 .
eq not3 1 = 0 .
eq not3 X = X .
op _and3_ : Level Level -> Level [assoc comm id: 1] .
eq X and3 0 = 0 .
eq 0 and3 0 = 0 .
eq X and3 X = X .
op _or3_ : Level Level -> Level [assoc comm id: 0] .
eq X or3 1 = 1 .
eq 1 or3 1 = 1 .
eq X or3 X = X .
endfm
We are now in a position to handle the primary definitions having to do with hazards: InterferenceP,σ , InstabilityP,σ,σ ′ ,
and HazardP,σ,σ ′ ; all of which are predicates on VariableP . Consider InterferenceP,σ . We declare an equationally defined
function that takes two arguments, one a term of sort ProductionRuleSet corresponding to P, and the second a term of
sort Map{Variable,Level} corresponding to σ , and returns a term of sort 2ˆVariable corresponding to InterferenceP,σ .
Recall how InterferenceP,σ ⊆ VariableP was defined: for all y ∈ VariableP , y ∈ InterferenceP,σ if and only if there exists
g1 → y ↑, g2 → y ↓∈ P such that σ(g1) = σ(g2) = 1. We accomplish this in Maude with two auxiliary functions.
InterfPred determines if a variable satisfies the interference property and InterfFilter filters the set VariableP by
applying InterfPred to every variable in P one-by-one.
fmod AUX-SEMANTICS-5 is pr AUX-SEMANTICS-4 .
... --- meta-variable declarations omitted
op InterfPred :
Variable ProductionRuleSet Map{Variable,Level} -> Bool .
ceq InterfPred(Y, P, Sigma) = true
if [G+ -> Y +] [G- -> Y -] P’ := P
/\ Sigma(G+) == 1 and Sigma(G-) == 1 .
eq InterfPred(Y, P, Sigma) = false [owise] .
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op Interference-{_,_} :
ProductionRuleSet Map{Variable,Level} -> 2ˆVariable .
eq Interference-{P,Sigma} =
InterfFilter(Variable-{P}, P, Sigma) .
op InterfFilter :
2ˆVariable ProductionRuleSet
Map{Variable,Level} -> 2ˆVariable .
eq InterfFilter(empty , P, Sigma) = empty .
eq InterfFilter((Y,YS), P, Sigma) =
if InterfPred(Y, P, Sigma) then Y else empty fi ,
InterfFilter(YS, P, Sigma) .
endfm
InstabilityP,σ,σ ′ ⊆ VariableP was defined in Section 3 so that for all y ∈ VariableP , y ∈ InstabilityP,σ,σ ′ if and only
if y ∈ EnabledP,σ , y /∈ EnabledP,σ ′ , and σ(y) = σ(y′). Recall that EnabledP,σ ⊆ VariableP was defined so that for all
y ∈ VariableP , y ∈ EnabledP,σ if and only if:
• σ(y) = 0 and there exists a g → y ↓ ∈ P such that σ(g) = 1, or
• σ(y) = 1 and there exists a g → y ↑ ∈ P such that σ(g) = 1.
The corresponding definitions inMaude are very similar, and use again the Pred and Filter pair idea from the definition
of Interference. InstFilter is omitted because it is not substantively different from InterfPred (see [11]).
fmod AUX-SEMANTICS-6 is pr AUX-SEMANTICS-5 .
... --- meta-variable declarations omitted
op EnabledPred :
Variable ProductionRuleSet Map{Variable,Level} -> Bool .
ceq EnabledPred(Y, P, Sigma) = true
if Sigma(Y) =/= 1
/\ [G+ -> Y +] P’ := P
/\ Sigma(G+) == 1 .
ceq EnabledPred(Y, P, Sigma) = true
if Sigma(Y) =/= 0
/\ [G- -> Y -] P’ := P
/\ Sigma(G-) == 1 .
eq EnabledPred(Y, P, Sigma) = false [owise] .
op InstPred :
Variable ProductionRuleSet Map{Variable,Level}
Map{Variable,Level} -> Bool .
ceq InstPred(Y, P, Sigma, Sigma’) = true
if EnabledPred(Y, P, Sigma )
/\ not EnabledPred(Y, P, Sigma’)
/\ Sigma(Y) == Sigma’(Y) .
eq InstPred(Y, P, Sigma, Sigma’) = false [owise] .
op Instability-{_,_,_} :
ProductionRuleSet Map{Variable,Level}
Map{Variable,Level} -> 2ˆVariable .
eq Instability {P, Sigma, Sigma’} =
InstFilter(Variable-{P}, P, Sigma, Sigma’) .
... InstFilter omitted
endfm
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HazardP,σ,σ ′ is transcribed directly. Recall that HazardP,σ,σ ′ is just the union of InterferenceP,σ ′ and InstabilityP,σ,σ ′ , plus
the propagation of any X values.
fmod AUX-SEMANTICS-7 is pr AUX-SEMANTICS-6 .
... --- meta-variable declarations omitted
op HazardPred :
Variable ProductionRuleSet Map{Variable,Level}
Map{Variable,Level} -> Bool .
ceq HazardPred(Y, P, Sigma, Sigma’) = true
if InterfPred(Y, P, Sigma’) .
ceq HazardPred(Y, P, Sigma, Sigma’) = true
if InstPred(Y, P, Sigma, Sigma’) .
ceq HazardPred(Y, P, Sigma, Sigma’) = true
if [G -> Y D] P’ := P
/\ Sigma(G) == X .
eq HazardPred(Y, P, Sigma, Sigma’) = false [owise] .
op Hazard-{_,_,_} :
ProductionRuleSet Map{Variable,Level}
Map{Variable,Level} -> 2ˆVariable .
eq Hazard-{P, Sigma, Sigma’} =
HazardFilter(Variable-{P}, P, Sigma, Sigma’) .
... HazardFilter omitted
endfm
Subsequent to HazardP,σ,σ ′ we defined ActionP and A|y, where A ⊆ ActionP and y ∈ VariableP . Recall that actions are
either pairs containing a variable and a level, or the special action skip. The restriction operator on a set of actions picks
those non-skip actions with a particular variable given as the first component.
fmod AUX-SEMANTICS-8 is pr AUX-SEMANTICS-7 .
sort Action .
op _:=_ : Variable Level -> Action .
op skip : -> Action .
endfm
view Action from TRIV to AUX-SEMANTICS-8 is
sort Elt to Action .
endv
fmod AUX-SEMANTICS-9 is pr AUX-SEMANTICS-8 .
pr SET{Action} * (sort Set{Action} to 2ˆAction) .
... --- meta-variable declarations omitted
op _|_ : 2ˆAction Variable -> 2ˆAction .
eq (Y := V , A) | Y = Y := V , (A | Y) .
eq A | Y = empty [owise] .
endfm
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The following rewrite rules are used to mimic the effect of the four inference rules
·
σ(g) = 1〈g → x ↑, (σ,H)〉 −→ x := 1
·
σ(g) = 1〈g → x ↓, (σ,H)〉 −→ x := 0
·
x ∈ H〈g → x d, (σ,H)〉 −→ x := X
·
〈g → x d, (σ,H)〉 −→ skip
mod AUX-SEMANTICS-10 is pr AUX-SEMANTICS-9 .
... --- meta-variable declarations omitted
op <_,_> : ProductionRule State -> [Action] .
crl < [G -> Y +], (Sigma,H) > => (Y := 1)
if Sigma(G) == 1 .
crl < [G -> Y -], (Sigma,H) > => (Y := 0)
if Sigma(G) == 1 .
crl < [G -> Y D], (Sigma,H) > => (Y := X)
if Y in H .
rl < [G -> Y D], (Sigma,H) > => skip .
endm
Notice that the <_,_> constructor yields a term of kind [Action] (see [5, Section 3.5]), but without a proper sort. This
will be crucial when we define the rewrite rule corresponding to −→P to ensure that all of the 〈rj, (σ,H)〉 get rewritten
according to the above rules into actions aj; that is, terms of sort Action.
The top-level rewrite rule that ultimately gives us −→P relies on rewriting logic equivalents for σ [a1, . . . , am] and
H[σ, a1, . . . , am]. We start with σ [a1, . . . , am], which was defined in Section 3 according to
σ [a1, . . . , am](x) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 if A|x = {x := 1}
0 if A|x = {x := 0}
X if A|x = {x := X} or |A|x| > 1
σ(x) if A|x = ∅
fmod AUX-SEMANTICS-11 is pr AUX-SEMANTICS-9 .
... --- meta-variable declarations omitted
op _[_] :
Map{Variable,Level} 2ˆAction -> Map{Variable,Level} .
eq empty [A] = empty .
eq (Y |-> V , Sigma) [A] = sigma’(Y, V, A) , (Sigma[A]) .
op sigma’ : Variable Level 2ˆAction -> Entry{Variable,Level} .
ceq sigma’(Y, V, A) = Y |-> 1
if (Y := 1) == A | Y .
ceq sigma’(Y, V, A) = Y |-> 0
if (Y := 0) == A | Y .
ceq sigma’(Y, V, A) = Y |-> X
if (Y := X) == (A | Y) or | (A | Y) | > 1 .
eq sigma’(Y, V, A) = Y |-> V [owise] .
endfm
H[σ, a1, . . . , am] is similarly straightforward. Following the definition from Section 3, H[σ, a1, . . . , am] ⊆ VariableP
such that for all y ∈ VariableP , y ∈ H[σ, a1, . . . , am] iff
• y ∈ HazardP,σ,σ [a1,...,am], or• y ∈ H and σ(y) = σ [a1, . . . , am](y).
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fmod AUX-SEMANTICS-12 is pr AUX-SEMANTICS-11 .
... --- meta-variable declarations omitted
op HPred : Variable ProductionRuleSet State 2ˆAction -> Bool .
ceq HPred(Y, P, (Sigma,H), A) = true
if HazardPred(Y, P, Sigma, Sigma[A]) .
ceq HPred(Y, P, (Sigma,H), A) = true
if Y in H
/\ Sigma(Y) == (Sigma[A])(Y) .
eq HPred(Y, P, (Sigma,H), A) = false [owise] .
op _[_,_]‘{_} :
2ˆVariable Map{Variable,Level} 2ˆAction
ProductionRuleSet -> 2ˆVariable .
eq H [Sigma, A] {P} = HFilter(Variable-{P}, P, (Sigma,H), A) .
op HFilter :
2ˆVariable ProductionRuleSet State
2ˆAction -> 2ˆVariable .
eq HFilter(empty , P, (Sigma,H), A) = empty .
eq HFilter((Y,YS), P, (Sigma,H), A) =
if HPred(Y, P, (Sigma,H), A) then Y else empty fi ,
HFilter(YS, P, (Sigma,H), A) .
endfm
Finally, we give a conditional rewrite rule that captures the earlier top-level inference rule
〈r1, (σ,H)〉 −→ a1 . . . 〈rm, (σ,H)〉 −→ am
(σ,H) −→P (σ [a1, . . . , am],H[σ, a1, . . . , am])
mod SEMANTICS is pr AUX-SEMANTICS-12 .
pr AUX-SEMANTICS-10 .
... --- meta-variable declarations omitted
vars A : 2ˆAction .
sort Configuration .
op _{_} : State ProductionRuleSet -> Configuration .
op mkActs : ProductionRuleSet State -> [2ˆAction] .
eq mkActs(empty, (Sigma,H)) = empty .
eq mkActs(R P , (Sigma,H)) =
< R, (Sigma,H) > , mkActs(P, (Sigma,H)) .
crl (Sigma,H) {P} => (Sigma[A],H[Sigma,A] {P}) {P}
if mkActs(P, (Sigma,H)) => A .
endm
There are a couple ofways inwhich the rewriting logic definition appears different from the corresponding inference rule.
First, note that since we are using the logical symbol−→ (from rewriting logic) to define−→P (from our static semantics),
the production rule set parametermust be encoded in the terms being rewritten. This is the purpose of the _{_} constructor.
The second difference is that the single condition of the rewrite rule above
mkActs(P, (Sigma,H)) => A
serves the purpose of themultiple premises of the inference rule
〈r1, (σ,H)〉 −→ a1 . . . 〈rm, (σ,H)〉 −→ am
(σ,H) −→P (σ [a1, . . . , am],H[σ, a1, . . . , am])
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The reason for this difference is that the number of premises, m, is not fixed, but rather scales dynamically with the size of
the production rule set; in rewriting logic, however, the number of conditions in a rewrite rule is fixed.
Finally, it is important to note that while mkActs is only kinded, the variable A has sort 2ˆAction. This ensures that all
of the individual production rules are rewritten to actions in the condition, before a computation step is taken.
5. Strong bisimulation between SPRS andRPRS
This section establishes a strong bisimulation between two transition systems: one induced by the set-theoretic semantics
of production rule sets, SPRS, and the other induced by the executable semantics given in rewriting logic, RPRS. In so doing,
confidence is raised in the correctness of the two semantic formalizations, as well as in the use of the executable semantics
as an analysis tool. This increased confidence applies in particular to the model checking results presented later in Section
6.
The strong bisimulation result is obtained as follows. First, we define a function, castP , that maps states in the set-
theoretic semantics to corresponding states in the rewriting logic semantics. We then make explicit the transition systems
associated to both the semantics; and finally we show that the two are strongly bisimilar via castP . This result yields as
corollaries that hazard freedom and deadlock freedom, which are also defined formally later in this section, are preserved
by the mapping between the two semantics.
We introduce a number of mathematical conventions that are used throughout this section. First, we assume that RPRS
is comprised as
RPRS = (PRS, EPRS, RPRS) .
Use of the sort name Configuration is overloaded to also denote the set
TPRS/EPRS,Configuration
of elements of TPRS/EPRS of sort Configuration; the distinction will be clear from context.
5.1. castP
Fix a production rule set P. Our bisimulation relation is defined by a function castP taking each state (σ,H) ∈ StateP to a
corresponding termin therewriting logic specificationRPRS; specifically,castP((σ,H))willbea termof sortConfiguration.
That is, applying the overloading of Configuration specified above, castP is a function
castP : StateP −→ Configuration.
castP is defined by means of two auxiliary cast functions, one that recurses over the structure of an element of StateP ,
yielding a term of sort State, and a second recursing over the structure of a production rule set and yielding a term of sort
ProductionRuleSet; specifically,
castP(s) = (cast(s)){cast(P)}.
To simplify the presentation note that we have used “cast” in an ad-hoc polymorphic way to denote both the function
that converts the state part, as well as the function that converts the production rule set. cast will also name all similar
functions converting other types of objects in the set-theoretic semantics into terms in the rewriting logic semantics.
The definition of cast functions is largely routine. For most constructs in the set-theoretic formalization, there is a
corresponding operator in the rewriting logic semantics with the same arguments and we simply generate that operator
and then recurse. For example, individual production rules are cast as
cast(g → x d) = [cast(g) -> cast(x) cast(d)]
At the bottom are the atomic elements of the syntax, such as variables and the transition directions, which are cast as
cast(↑) = + cast(↓) = -
Casting finite sets made out of simpler elements highlights an interesting point. The following definition is unambiguous
and correct in rewriting logic, as well as in Maude, by asserting that the operator _ _, juxtaposition, is associative, commu-
tative, and idempotent. Specifically in Maude, its predefined SET module [5, Section 9.12.2] employs equational attributes
[5, Section 4.4.1] and associate-commutative rewriting for associativity and commutativity, and for idempotency an explicit
equation is used.
cast({r1, . . . , rm}) = cast(r1) · · · cast(rm)
Similarly, valuation functions of the form σ : VariableP −→ Level can be viewed as sets of pairs, and are cast accordingly
into
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cast({(y1, v1), . . . , (ym, vm)})
= cast(y1) |-> cast(v1) , . . . , cast(ym) |-> cast(vm)
By way of summarizing, consider the production rule set corresponding to a single nand-gate
P = {x1 ∧ x2 → y ↓,¬x1 ∨ ¬x2 → y ↑}
and a state s = (σ,∅) where σ(x1) = σ(x2) = σ(y) = 1. Then castP(s) yields the following term
(’x1 |-> 1 , ’x2 |-> 1, ’y |-> 1, empty)
{ [ ’x1 and ’x2 -> ’y - ]
[ (not ’x1) or (not ’x2) -> ’y + ] }
The following lemma will be useful to simplify some of the proofs given later.
Lemma 1. Let P be a production rule set.
castP : StateP −→ Configuration
is injective.
Proof. Straightforward by induction on StateP . 
5.2. Strong bisimulation
Having defined castP we are now in a position to state our main result establishing the strong bisimulation between
SPRS andRPRS. For notational convenience and symmetry, for a given production rule set P, clear from context, we use−→M
to denote the relation−→P defined according to the set-theoretic semantics SPRS. Similarly, we use−→R to denote the one
step rewriting relation induced byRPRS on terms of sort Configuration.
Theorem 1. Let P be a production rule set. Consider the transition systems
TM
def= (StateP,−→M)
TR
def= (Configuration,−→R)
castP , when seen as a relation, is a strong bisimulation between TM and TR.
The following lemma will be useful in the proof of the above theorem.
Lemma 2. Let P be a production rule set. For all g → x d ∈ P, (σ,H) ∈ StateP , and a ∈ ActionP , we have
〈g → x d, (σ,H)〉 −→ a
according to SPRS, if and only if
RPRS  cast(〈g → x d, (σ,H)〉) −→ cast(a)
Proof.
See Appendix A. 
Having this lemma, we can proceed with a proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1.
See Appendix A. 
The two correctness properties that we are concerned with, hazard freedom and deadlock freedom, can both be phrased
in terms of simple reachability queries. For a transition system A = (A,−→⊆ A × A) and an element a ∈ A, we let
ReachA(a) ⊆ A denote the set of reachable states from a; i.e.,
{a′ ∈ A | a −→∗ a′}.
The relative correctness of SPRS and RPRS with respect to these correctness properties will fall out through instances of the
following corollary to Theorem 1.
M. Katelman et al. / Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming 81 (2012) 929–956 945
Corollary 1. Let P be a production rule set and s0 ∈ StateP . For any pair of predicates
QM ⊆ StateP and QR ⊆ Configuration
such that s ∈ QM if and only if castP(s) ∈ QR, then
ReachTM(s0) ⊆ QM if and only if ReachTR(castP(s0)) ⊆ QR.
Proof of Corollary 1.
See Appendix A. 
5.3. Hazard freedom
Hazard freedom essentially asserts the impossibility of reaching a state where any node takes the value X. Let P be a
production rule set. We define a predicate Hazard!P ⊆ StateP such that for all (σ,H) ∈ StateP , (σ,H) ∈ Hazard!P if and only
if there exists a y ∈ VariableP with σ(y) = X.
Definition 3. Let P be production rule set and σ : VariableP −→ Level. We say that SPRS exhibits hazard freedomwith respect
to P and σ if and only if for all
(σ ′,H′) ∈ ReachTM((σ,∅))
(σ ′,H′) /∈ Hazard!P .
In rewriting logic, we can give an equationally-defined function, Hazard!, which is essentially the characteristic function
of Hazard!P .
op Hazard! : Configuration -> Bool [frozen] .
eq Hazard!(((Y |-> X, SIGMA), H){P}) = true .
eq Hazard!((SIGMA, H){P}) = false [owise] .
Definition 4. Let P be production rule set and σ : VariableP −→ Level. We say thatRPRS exhibits hazard freedomwith respect
to P and σ if and only if for all
c′ ∈ ReachTR(castP((σ,∅)))
such that we have Hazard!(c′) = false.
Proposition 1. Let P be production rule set and σ : VariableP −→ Level.RPRS exhibits hazard freedom with respect to P and σ
if and only if SPRS exhibits hazard freedom with respect to P and σ .
Proof. According to Corollary 1, it is sufficient to show that for all s /∈ StateP , s ∈ Hazard!P if and only if Hazard!(castP(s))= false. This is straightforward by induction on states. 
5.4. Deadlock freedom
As with hazard freedom, deadlock freedom will be characterized with respect to a production rule set and an initial
valuation. It is essentially an assertionof the impossibility of reaching a statewhereno rules are enabled.One small difference
from the definition of enablement is needed to account for X values, however. Equivalently, it asserts the impossibility of
reaching a state where the only transitions that are possible are idle transitions.
Let P be a production rule set and σ : VariableP −→ Level and recall from Section 3.3 the definition of EnabledP,σ ⊆
VariableP . For all y ∈ VariableP , y ∈ EnabledP,σ if and only if
• σ(y) = 0 and there exists a g → y ↓ ∈ P such that σ(g) = 1, or
• σ(y) = 1 and there exists a g → y ↑ ∈ P such that σ(g) = 1.
We define a new predicate, SwitchableP,σ,H ⊆ VariableP , similar to EnabledP,σ , but also with a parameter H ⊆ VariableP . For
a variable y ∈ VariableP and a state (σ,H) ∈ StateP , y ∈ SwitchableP,σ,H if and only if either y ∈ EnabledP,σ or y = X and
y ∈ H.
The definition of deadlock freedom is then analogous to the definition of hazard freedom, with SwitchableP,σ,H = ∅
serving the purpose of σ /∈ Hazard!P .
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Definition 5. Let P be production rule set and σ : VariableP −→ Level. We say that SPRS exhibits deadlock freedom with
respect to P and σ if and only if for all
(σ ′,H′) ∈ ReachTM((σ,∅))
SwitchableP,σ ′,H′ = ∅.
Above in Section 4we defined the rewriting logic equivalent to the conditions that definewhether a particular variable is
in the set of things that are enabled. This was denoted EnabledPred. We define a similar notion for SwitchableP,σ,H , called
SwitchPred.
op SwitchPred : Variable ProductionRuleSet Map{Variable,Level}
2ˆVariable -> Bool .
ceq SwitchPred(Y, P, Sigma, H) = true
if Sigma(Y) =/= 1
/\ [G+ -> Y +] P’ := P
/\ Sigma(G+) == 1 .
ceq SwitchPred(Y, P, Sigma, H) = true
if Sigma(Y) =/= 0
/\ [G- -> Y -] P’ := P
/\ Sigma(G-) == 1 .
ceq SwitchPred(Y, P, Sigma, H) = true
if Sigma(Y) =/= X
/\ Y in H .
eq SwitchPred(Y, P, Sigma, H) = false [owise] .
To get Switchable from SwitchPred, we simply need a function that gets all of the variables from a production rule
set and then filters the result by SwitchPred. This is entirely routine, and can be had in exactly the sameway as we defined
for, for example, InterfFilter.
Definition 6. Let P be production rule set and σ : VariableP −→ Level. We say that P exhibits deadlock freedom with respect
to P and σ if and only if for all
(SIGMA’,H’){P} ∈ ReachTR(castP((σ,∅)))
Switchable-{P,SIGMA’,H’} = empty.
Proposition 2. Let P be production rule set and σ : VariableP −→ Level.RPRS exhibits deadlock freedom with respect to P and
σ if and only if SPRS exhibits deadlock freedom with respect to P and σ .
Proof. Similar to that for preservation of hazard freedom. 
6. Hazard and deadlock freedom analysis withRPRS and Maude
This section investigates the feasibility of using our executable semantics and the formal tools provided by Maude to
prove hazard freedom and deadlock freedom, two properties that every asynchronous circuit must typically satisfy in order
to be considered correct. All of the Maude source code and example circuits used for experimentation are open source and
available at [11].
Section 6.1 briefly describes each of the asynchronous circuits we are subjecting to analysis. Section 6.2 describes the
commands necessary to check hazard and deadlock freedom using Maude and the semantics RPRS presented in Section 4.
These results demonstrate the need for some optimizations, which are described in Section 6.3, followed in Section 6.4 by
modified analysis results with the optimizations enabled. Due to the highly asynchronous nature of production rule sets,
there is an enormous state space explosion even for simple circuits; therefore, the optimizations we present are essential to
model check circuits in practice.
6.1. Circuits analyzed
Our experiments cover six circuits of size varying from 12 production rules up to 130 production rules. The complete
production rule set for each circuit can be found in [11].
• 3InverterRing (12 production rules): A ring oscillator is typically the first circuit used to demonstrate the viability of
a new process technology.
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Fig. 2. Hazard freedom and deadlock freedommodel checking results,without optimizations. System configuration: Maude 2.5, Intel Xeon X5570 (2.93GHz, 8MiB
L3), 24GiB RAM, 64-bit Linux, kernel version 2.6.18. “TIME” means the experiment timed out (30 minutes), and “MEM” means it reached a preset memory limit
(4GiB).
• ClosedBuffer (26 production rules): Simple logical buffer stages are generally used to balance parallel paths in an
asynchronous pipeline. Closing the buffer requires a source to produce tokens to send into the buffer and a sink to empty
the buffer.
• Toggle (28 production rules): A circuit that alternates between sourcing a one or a zero token are essential components
of most test harnesses.
• PCHBAndFixed (66 production rules): The PCHB (pre-charged half buffer) is a customized quasi delay-insensitive gate
that is electrically similar to a stage of domino logic. A PCHB can be used in a data-path to perform computation, it can
be used for control, or it can act as a combination thereof. In this instance the input to the PCHB is a fixed value.
• 1BitFullAdderFixed (118 production rules): The bit-slice ripple-carry adder is ubiquitous in digital VLSI design. This
variant is implemented as a quasi delay-insensitive PCHB with the input of the adder tied to a fixed value source.
• PCHBAndToggle (130 production rules): This instance of a PCHB AND-gate makes use of the toggle element to alternate
the input pattern thus generating each possible input permutation.
6.2. Model checking experiments
The hazard and deadlock freedom analyses are performed usingMaude’s search command [5, Section 12]. search does
a breadth-first search enumerating all terms reachable from a given initial term through rewriting. If this set of reachable
terms is finite and one is interested in checking computable invariants, as is the case for both hazard and deadlock freedom,
then search acts as a decision procedure for the satisfaction of the given invariant.
As described above in Section 5.3, the invariant we want to check for hazard freedom is the negation of Hazard!, or
alternatively, that no reachable state satisfies Hazard!. We use this second formulation, which is accomplished in Maude
by executing the following command,
search [1] initialC =>* C:Configuration such that Hazard!(C) .
The term initialC equals castP((σ,∅)) where σ denotes the valuation of nodes of the device at reset. If no solution
is returned, then the device is considered hazard-free with respect to that reset state. If not, then the device has a potential
hazard.
The situation for deadlock freedom is analogous, except that the invariant for deadlock freedom is that
Switchable-{_,_,_} should never be empty; again, we use the dual formalization, however. The appropriate incantation
is 3
search [1] initialC =>* (SIGMA’,H’){P} such that
Switchable-{P,SIGMA’,H’} == empty .
Applying these checks to each of the circuits described above in Section 6.1 we find that none of the checks are able to
finish due to exhausting the system’s availablememory resources, which are substantial for a contemporary system (24GiB).
For consistencywith the presentation of subsequent results, this initial experiment is reported in Fig. 2. Clearly, some formof
simplification/optimization is needed to reduce memory consumption and gain tractability even for the very small circuits
we are considering.
6.3. Performance optimizations
Two optimizations to the rewriting logic semantics,RPRS, are now developed. These are specifically aimed at addressing
excessive memory consumption and result in tractable analysis of all but our largest circuit, PCHBAndToggle. In the case of
the largest circuit, the analysis is still improved in the sense that, with respect to the system configuration limits that we
set, it goes from being memory bound to being computation bound (Of course, it is possible that relaxing the time-limit
constraint, say to an hour, might once again cause us to encounter a memory limitation; however, having observed system
behavior as the experiment was run, this appears to be unlikely: the memory footprint was not growing very slowly when
the time limit was reached.)
3 The reason why the search command cannot use the =>!modality is because empty sets of actions can always produce idle transitions.
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Out-of-controlmemory usage is primarily due to the condition of the top-level rewrite rule inRPRS, which, recalling from
Section 4, is
mkActs(P, (Sigma,I)) => A.
Suppose that we have the production rule set
[ ’x -> ’z -]
[ ’y -> ’w -]
[not ’y -> ’w +]
Applying mkActs to this set yields the following term of kind [2ˆAction]
< [ ’x -> ’z -], (Sigma,I) > ,
< [ ’y -> ’w -], (Sigma,I) > ,
< [not ’y -> ’w +], (Sigma,I) >
and each of the elements of this set are rewritten one-by-one until a term of sort 2ˆAction is obtained, e.g., say
’z := 0 ,
skip ,
’w := X
In deriving this term, Maude is necessarily inefficient, because it cannot know that the rewriting of each element of the
set is independent from the others; that is, outside of the rule chosen to rewrite each element, the order in which these
rewrites are applied is inconsequential, so rewriting
< [ ’x -> ’z -], (Sigma,I) > ,
skip ,
< [not ’y -> ’w +], (Sigma,I) >
and then
’z := 0 ,
skip ,
< [not ’y -> ’w +], (Sigma,I) >
does not need to be considered separately from first rewriting
’z := 0 ,
< [ ’y -> ’w -], (Sigma,I) > ,
< [not ’y -> ’w +], (Sigma,I) >
followed by
’z := 0 ,
skip ,
< [not ’y -> ’w +], (Sigma,I) >
Maude must, however, attempt all 2k possible orderings, where k is the number of production rules, for what is really just a
single possible next state.
The independent nature of the rewriting steps can be communicated to Maude by, instead of producing a set of terms to
rewrite, having mkActs produce a list with some arbitrary order and then using matching to force the rewriting to iterate
over this list.
The second optimization reduces the possible sets of actions that, at the condition of the top-most rewrite rule in RPRS,
become bound to the variable A. Accomplishing this reduction is done through a small modification to the inference rules
for −→ in Definition 2, so that, for example,
·
σ(g) = 1〈g → x ↑, (σ,H)〉 −→ x := 1
is modified so that the side condition includes also that σ(x) = 1; that is σ(g) = 1 becomes σ(g) = 1 and σ(x) = 1.
Of course, this change must get reflected at the rewriting logic level as well. The correctness of this optimization, while not
proved in detail, follows from the invariance of the updates to σ and H during a transition when, for example, σ(x) = 1 and
one of the updating actions is x := 1.
6.4. Model checking experiments redux
The result of applying each optimization in isolation, as well as the aggregate effect of applying both in tandem, is shown
in Fig. 3 for hazard freedom, and in Fig. 4 for deadlock freedom. With these optimizations, some of our example circuits can
be checked quite quickly. Scalability clearly remains an issue, however, even after applying the above optimizations, though
they accomplish much over the original semantics, which was, above all, designed for conceptual clarity.
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Fig. 3. Hazard freedom model checking results, with optimizations. System configuration: Maude 2.5, Intel Xeon X5570 (2.93GHz, 8MiB L3), 24GiB RAM, 64-bit
Linux, kernel version 2.6.18. “TIME” means the experiment timed out (30 minutes), and “MEM” means it reached a preset memory limit (4GiB).
Fig. 4. Deadlock freedommodel checking results,with optimizations. System configuration: Maude 2.5, Intel Xeon X5570 (2.93GHz, 8MiB L3), 24GiB RAM, 64-bit
Linux, kernel version 2.6.18. “TIME” means the experiment timed out (30 minutes), and “MEM” means it reached a preset memory limit (4GiB).
Therefore, more optimizations along the lines of those above, as well as clever new ideas will be needed in the future to
make automatic checks for hazards and deadlock reliably tractable for modern circuits. Some additional tractability can be
gained by looking at more practical timing assumptions, described in the next section, which further reduce the amount of
concurrency.
7. Speed-independent and quasi-delay-insensitive circuits
The primary objective of this paper is to improve upon our work in [10,12] for the unrestricted, or delay-insensitive, case,
developing a clearer set-theoretic semantics, an executable rewriting logic semantics that is almost identical, and showing
that the updated executable semantics is still capable of being used for automated formal analysis. However, two other
timing assumptions, speed-independence [23,25] and quasi-delay-insensitivity [15,18], that we have worked on previously
bear mention as well, so as to complete the picture of where our current efforts regarding the formal semantics and analysis
of production rule sets and to understand how we intend go proceed in future work.
Toward that end, this section briefly presents analysis results on the same set of circuits used above, but under the speed-
independence and quasi-delay-insensitive timing assumptions. The results given are with respect to an implementation of
these timing assumptions in Maude [10]. That implementation was developed in accordance with [12], which provides a
detailed account of our earlier effort to formalize these two timing assumptions in a non-executable way. In future work,
as we mention in Section 9, it will be important to give similar treatment to these more complex timing assumptions as we
have done in the previous sections of this paper for the delay-insensitive case, iterating on the non-executable semantics in
order to make them clearer, and formally connecting the non-executable semantics with a revised executable semantics in
rewriting logic. However, this is a very substantial undertaking, likely requiring the length of the currentwork for each timing
assumption individually to specify both a non-executable and executable semantics and prove their equivalence through a
suitable bisimulation; this is outside the scope of the current paper.
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Fig. 5. Hazard freedom model checking results for all three timing assumptions. System configuration: Maude 2.5, Intel Xeon X5570 (2.93GHz, 8MiB L3), 24GiB
RAM, 64-bit Linux, kernel version 2.6.18. “–” indicates that the experiment timed out or exhausted available memory resources.
At a high level, both speed-independence and quasi-delay-insensitivity represent restrictions on relative delay of signals
on forks, which occur when the output of a gate fans out to the input of two or more subsequent gates. Speed-independence
imposes the restriction that if one branch of a fork switches to a new level, then all branches must switch simultaneously.
On the other hand, quasi-delay-insensitivity allows for some branches of a fork to have stabilized before others do, but
only until a sequence of “acknowledgments” from the stabilized branch courses through the circuit to the input of the
gate connected to the non-stabilized branch of the original fork. Formal details of these timing assumptions, given as a non-
executable semantics, can be found in [12] and spend great timedefiningprecisely, for example, a notion of acknowledgment.
Additional details are too extensive to go into additional detail here, but can be found in the above reference (see also [19]).
The behaviors admitted by delay-insensitivity, quasi-delay-insensitivity, and speed-independence are related as follows:
delay-insensitivity admits strictly more behaviors than quasi-delay-insensitivity, which in turn admits strictly more behav-
iors than speed-independence. Both of the more restrictive timing assumptions reduce the set of possible device behaviors,
thereby making formal analysis easier. The trade-off is that one must analyze the circuit separately to ensure that the
assumptions made about timing are actually valid given the physics of the device.
In addition, the more restrictive timing assumptions have the added, although somewhat counter intuitive, advantage of
being theoretically more capable, in the sense that the delay-insensitive timing assumption is so permissive that the set of
useful production rule sets becomes limited because more of them imply hazardous circuit behaviors. A proof of this fact is
developed in [14]. It is also worth noting that, for hazard freedom, we have shown previously that speed-independence and
quasi-delay-insensitivity are equivalent, yielding a simpler check for the property relative to the quasi-delay-insensitivity
assumption. The proof of this fact is developed in [12].
Figs. 5 and 6 present the results of analyzing the circuits from Section 6.1 under the more restrictive timing assumptions.
Despite the fact that the number of behaviors is reduced, we found ourselves still unable to exhaustively prove hazard
freedom and deadlock freedom for our largest circuit, PCHBAndToggle.
Finally, we experimented with an optimization specifically tailored for the speed-independence case, where we simply
removed production rules corresponding to wires. With this optimization we were able to check hazard freedom for all of
the example circuits listed above, as shown in Fig. 7. Due to the result from [12] cited above, this implies hazard freedom in
the quasi-delay-insensitive case as well.
M. Katelman et al. / Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming 81 (2012) 929–956 951
Fig. 6. Deadlock freedommodel checking results for all three timing assumptions. System configuration: Maude 2.5, Intel Xeon X5570 (2.93GHz, 8MiB L3), 24GiB
RAM, 64-bit Linux, kernel version 2.6.18. “–” indicates that the experiment timed out or exhausted available memory resources.
Fig. 7. Hazard freedommodel checking results, wires removed. System configuration: Maude 2.5, Intel Xeon X5570 (2.93GHz, 8MiB L3), 24GiB RAM, 64-bit Linux,
kernel version 2.6.18.
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8. Related work
The work presented in this paper covers two somewhat separate topics and therefore the related work falls into two
distinct categories: the semantics of production rule sets, as a topic of interest in its own right, and the formal verification
of asynchronous digital circuits, specifically hazard freedom.
Regarding the first topic, namely, the semantics of production rule sets, the current work improves upon our own earlier
efforts in [10,12]. The current efforts, including both the set-theoretic and the rewriting logic styles, provide a cleaner and
simpler presentation of the delay-insensitive case. To the best of our knowledge, no other works have presented semantic
issues as an end in and of themselves, but rather simply in support of some larger goal, such as Martin’s synthesis method
[15,17]. The semantics has also been addressed in an auxiliary way to prove that the scope of possible circuits under delay-
insensitivity is limited [16] and that quasi delay-insensitive circuits are Turing-complete [14]. The semantics from [15,17]
was also examined in [26] in order to clarify the relationship between production rule sets and corresponding physical circuit
implementations.
The second topic addressed is formal verification of asynchronous circuits, in particular verifying hazard freedom and
deadlock freedom. Our work seems to be the first that attempts to use the formal executable semantics approach (modulo
our work in [10], on which the current work is based). It is also the only work that we know of that provides an extensive
formal verification platform for asynchronous circuits designed using production rule sets, which we get via Maude’s built
in tools, including a full LTL model checker.
The methods developed in [3] use two versions of the circuit; one high-level and one low-level. Both designs are given
as specialized automata, and while a full enumeration of the reachable state space in the high-level design is necessary, a
careful analysis shows how to avoid doing the same for the low-level design. This yields a more efficient analysis of hazard
free operation, since the high-level design has a smaller state space than the more detailed, low-level design. [28] uses
the modern program analysis technique of abstract interpretation to reason about hazards in asynchronous circuits. [29]
uses a standard symbolic model checker to verify hazard free operation of speed-independent circuits, and an older tool
called prlint [6] purports to exhaustively check hazard free operation of a production rule set. prlint is no longer easily
available, and we were unable to acquire a version capable of running on a modern Linux workstation.
A class of Petri nets, called signal transition graphs (STGs), can be used to model certain aspects of asynchronous circuits
[13], and a number of works, e.g., [4,24,27,30,31] propose methods of model checking these Petri net specifications. Certain
high-level properties such as liveness and fairness can be verified in this way, but the STG specification does not expose
low-level circuit properties like the timing of forks.
9. Conclusion
This paper improves upon our earlier work in [10,12], providing a cleaner formal semantics of production rule sets for
the delay-insensitive case, including both a set-theoretic semantics and an executable semantics in rewriting logic; which
is, to the best of our knowledge, the first of its kind. The utility of our work here is, first and foremost, toward promoting
a common understanding of what production rule sets mean, especially to those entering the field of asynchronous circuit
design; and, secondly for the purpose of formal analysis of such circuits.
Regarding formal analysis, the set-theoretic semantics is perhapsbest suited as the foundation for provingmeta-theorems
about production rule sets, as we did in [12]. The executable rewriting logic semantics is instead better suited to establishing
the functional correctness of individual circuits, as certain obligationsmay be discharged automatically, aswe showed above
and in [10].
A number of challenges remain, some rather daunting. Firstly, the speed-independence and quasi delay-insensitivity
cases from [12] should be further developed along the lines of what we did here for the delay-insensitive case. Second, there
is the issue of scalability; we have been able to automatically check hazard freedom and deadlock freedom for circuits up to
about one hundred production rules, but modern circuits can easily be four orders of magnitude larger.
One possibility is to investigate probabilistic methods in more detail, which are highly parallelizable and scale extremely
well. Existingwork on probabilistic rewrite systems and statisticalmodel checking [1,2] allows for a rewriting-based approach
to continue to be used, and perhaps even build directly on our work here.
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Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 2, Theorem 1, and Corollary 1
Proof of Lemma 2.
By cases on a:
• (skip): It is enoughtoshowthatboth 〈g → x d, (σ,H)〉 −→ skip,with respect toSPRS, andcast(〈g → x d, (σ,H)〉) −→
cast(skip), with respect toRPRS, hold unconditionally.
That 〈g → x d, (σ,H)〉 −→ skip holds unconditionally with respect to SPRS is established according to the rule (where
the variables used in the rule are not the same as those above; they are implicitly quantified)
·
〈g → x d, (σ,H)〉 −→ skip
Similarly, with respect toRPRS,
RPRS  cast(〈g → x d, (σ,H)〉) =
<[cast(g)->cast(x)cast(d)],(cast(σ ),cast(H))>
−→ skip = cast(skip)
due to the rewriting rule
rl < [G -> Y D], (Sigma,H) > => skip .
• (y := 1): (⇒) Suppose 〈g → x d, (σ,H)〉 −→ y := 1 holds with respect to SPRS; we show that also cast(〈g →
x d, (σ,H)〉) −→ cast(y := 1) with respect toRPRS.
Clearly, 〈g → x d, (σ,H)〉 −→ y := 1 may only hold with respect to SPRS according to the rule
·
σ(g) = 1〈g → x ↑, (σ,H)〉 −→ x := 1
which implies that σ(g) = 1, and also that d =↑ and y = x. Therefore,
cast(〈g → x d, (σ,H)〉)
= <[cast(g)->cast(x)+],(cast(σ ),cast(H))>
and matches the left-hand side of the rewrite rule
crl < [G -> Y +], (Sigma,H) > => (Y := 1)
if Sigma(G) == 1 .
That σ(g) = 1 implies also the condition of the rewriting rule:
cast(σ )(cast(g)) == 1
is straightforward. This yields, as needed, that
cast(〈g → x d, (σ,H)〉) −→ cast(x) := 1 = cast(y := 1).
(⇐) SupposeRPRS  cast(〈g → x d, (σ,H)〉) −→ cast(y := 1).
cast(y := 1) = cast(y) := 1, and it is clear that the only way this rewriting can occur is by application of the rule
crl < [G -> Y +], (Sigma,H) > => (Y := 1)
if Sigma(G) == 1 .
Through patternmatching, we get again that cast(y) = cast(x) and therefore that y = x; cast(d) = +, which implies
that d =↑; and that cast(σ )(cast(g)) == 1. Then, assuming that cast(σ )(cast(g)) == 1 one can straightfor-
wardly derive that σ(g) = 1.
·
σ(g) = 1〈g → x ↑, (σ,H)〉 −→ x := 1
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applies to 〈g → x d, (σ,H)〉 = 〈g → x ↑, (σ,H)〉whichultimately yields thedesired result that 〈g → x d, (σ,H)〉 −→
(x := 1) = (y := 1).
• The remaining cases are similar. 
Proof of Theorem 1.
(TR simulates TM): Let (σ,H), (σ ′,H′) ∈ StateP be such that
(σ,H) −→M (σ ′,H′)
According to Definition 2, there exist actions a1, . . . , am such that: (a) for each aj , 1 ≤ j ≤ m, 〈rj, (σ,H)〉 −→ aj , and (b)
(σ ′,H′) = (σ [a1, . . . , am],H[σ, a1, . . . , am])
Therefore, it is sufficient to prove that
castP((σ,H)) −→R castP((σ [a1, . . . , am],H[σ, a1, . . . , am]))
In order to show that the above relation holds, we will apply the top-level rewrite rule defined inRPRS, namely
crl (Sigma,H) {P} => (Sigma[A],H[Sigma,A] {P}) {P}
if mkActs(P, (Sigma,H)) => A .
and Lemma 2. Expanding castP((σ,H)) shows that it matches the left-hand side of this rule:
castP((σ,H)) = (cast(σ ),cast(H)){cast(P)}
For the condition, we first expand mkActs according to its definition, yielding
mkActs(cast(r1) . . . cast(rm),(cast(σ ),cast(H))) =
<cast(r1),(cast(σ ),cast(H))>, . . . ,<cast(rm),(cast(σ ),cast(H))>
and which, according to Lemma 2, rewrites to
cast(a1), . . . ,cast(am)
Therefore, by the above rewrite rule,which is part ofRPRS, weobtain thatcastP((σ,H)) rewrites to a term(Sigma’,H’){P}
with
Sigma’ = cast(σ )[cast(a1), . . . ,cast(am)]
and
H’ = cast(H)[cast(σ ),cast(a1), . . . ,cast(am)]{cast(P)}
Expanding castP((σ [a1, . . . , am],H[σ, a1, . . . , am])), one obtains a term
(cast(σ [a1, . . . , am]),cast(H[σ, a1, . . . , am])){cast(P)}
and so it remains to be proved that H’ = cast(H[σ, a1, . . . , am]), which is straightforward.
(TM simulates TR): Let (σ,H) ∈ StateP and let c′ be a term of sort Configuration such that
castP((σ,H)) −→R c′
As there is only a single rewrite rule inRPRS that operates on terms of the same kind as the sort Configuration, namely
crl (Sigma,H) {P} => (Sigma[A],H[Sigma,A] {P}) {P}
if mkActs(P, (Sigma,H)) => A .
c′ must be of the form
(cast(σ )[A],cast(H)[cast(σ ),A]{cast(P)}){cast(P)}
for some term A of sort 2ˆAction reachable via rewriting from the term
mkActs(cast(P),(cast(σ ),cast(H)))
Lemmas 2 and 1 about the injectivity of cast imply that, letting P = {r1, . . . , rm}, A is of the form
cast(a1), . . . ,cast(am)
with a1, . . . , am ∈ ActionP , such that for each aj , 1 ≤ j ≤ m, cast(aj) is had through rewriting a term of the form
<cast(rj),(cast(σ ),cast(H))>. Thisestablishes, foreach1 ≤ j ≤ m, thatRPRS  <cast(rj),(cast(σ ),cast(H))> −→
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cast(aj), and therefore by Lemma 2 also that 〈rj, (σ,H)〉 −→ aj . Then applying the rule
〈r1, (σ,H)〉 −→ a1 . . . 〈rm, (σ,H)〉 −→ am
(σ,H) −→P (σ [a1, . . . , am],H[σ, a1, . . . , am])
we get that (σ,H) −→M (σ [a1, . . . , am],H[σ, a1, . . . , am]). Again, it remains to be shown that the _[_] operators, for
each component of the state, correspond, which follows according to a straightforward induction. 
Proof of Corollary 1.
(⇒): Suppose that ReachTM(s0) ⊆ QM; we demonstrate by induction on TR reachability derivations (these transition
systems have finite carriers) that also
ReachTR(castP(s0)) ⊆ QR.
The induction hypothesis asserts that, for a reachable configuration
c ∈ ReachTR(castP(s0))
both of the following conditions hold: (1) c ∈ castP(StateP), and for the unique s ∈ StateP , guaranteed by Lemma 1, such
that castP(s) = c, (2) s ∈ ReachTM(s0). This implies that s ∈ QM and therefore that c ∈ QR.
The induction hypothesis clearly holds for c0 = castP(s0). Now, let
castP(s) = c ∈ Configuration
be such that it has both properties of the induction hypothesis and suppose that c −→R c′ with c′ ∈ Configuration. It
follows from Theorem1 and the induction hypothesis that there exists a s′ ∈ StateP such that s −→M s′ and castP(s′) = c′.
This implies that c ∈ castP(StateP) and that s′ ∈ ReachTM(s0).
(⇐): This direction follows similarly, but without the need of Lemma 1. 
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